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Abstract
Deutsch has recently (in quant-ph/9906015) offered a justification,
based only on the non-probabilistic axioms of quantum theory and of
classical decision theory, for the use of the standard quantum proba-
bility rules. In this note, this justification is examined.
1 Participating Guest, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
e-mail: JLFINKELSTEIN@lbl.gov
1
The origin, and indeed the meaning, of the probability rules of quan-
tum theory are often considered mysterious. In a recent article (ref. [1],
hereinafter denote by [D]), David Deutsch has offered a proof, based only
on the non-probabilistic axioms of quantum theory and of classical decision
theory, that a “rational decision maker” would act as if the standard prob-
ability rules of quantum theory were true. (See also ref. [2].) This result
could then be taken to justify these standard rules, without the need to
introduce any probabilistic axiom, or even the need to have any definition
of probability. It is the purpose of this note to examine the proof given in
[D].
[D] considers a decision maker who is offered the following game: an
observable Xˆ is to be measured on a quantum system which is in the state
|Ψ〉; the utility of the payoff offered is numerically equal to the result of the
measurement. The value of this game is denoted by V[|Ψ〉], and the proof
given in [D] is that, even without any probabilistic axioms, it follows that
V[|Ψ〉] = 〈Ψ|Xˆ|Ψ〉. (1)
The RHS of Eq. 1 is of course the value of the game that would follow from
the standard quantum probability rules; the derivation of Eq. 1 without
invoking any probability axioms can thus be considered a justification of
those rules.
I wish to examine a central part of the proof offered in [D], in which
the state |Ψ〉 is an equal-amplitude superposition of two eigenstates of Xˆ. I
will use the notation employed in [D], that x is an eigenvalue, and |x〉 the
corresponding eigenstate, of the operator Xˆ . Then the states we will be
concerned with can be written
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|x1〉+ |x2〉); (2)
this is also Eq. 7 of [D]. The non-probabilistic part of quantum theory implies
that the outcome of the measurement of Xˆ on the state given in Eq. 2 is
surely either x1 or x2 (but of course does not specify which one); from
this fact, together with axioms of classical decision theory, [D] deduces that
(Eq. 11 in [D])
V[ 1√
2
(|x1〉+ |x2〉)] =
1
2
(x1 + x2). (3)
This result (our Eq. 3) is called the “pivotal result” of [D].
But how could this result follow from the argument made in [D]? Let r
denote the outcome of the measurement of Xˆ on the state given in Eq. 2; then
the only requirement of quantum theory used in the proof of Eq. 3 is that
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either r = x1 or r = x2. Now suppose (consistent with that requirement)
that the value of r were in fact determinate, and were given (in the case
|x1| 6= |x2|) by
r = x1 if |x1| > |x2|
r = x2 if |x2| > |x1|. (4)
When the outcome of the measurement is determinate, the value of the game
is simply equal to the outcome, so if, for example, we set x1 = 1 and x2 = 0,
this supposition gives r = 1, and so the LHS of Eq. 3 would be 1 while the
RHS of that equation would be 0.5.
The proof of Eq. 3 (Eq. 11 of [D]) begins with Eq. 8 of [D]. That equation,
specialized to the case of an equal-amplitude superposition of two eigen-
states, reads
V[ 1√
2
(|x1 + k〉+ |x2 + k〉)] = k + V[
1√
2
(|x1〉+ |x2〉)], (5)
and is supposed to be true for any k. However, if the notation in Eq. 5
is taken to mean the same as that in Eqs. 1 and 2 (e.g., that |x1 + k〉 is
the eigenstate corresponding to eigenvalue x1 + k), the game on the LHS of
Eq. 5 may not even be possible. In writing Eq. 2, we have assumed that the
operator Xˆ has eigenvalues x1 and x2, but since nothing else was assumed
about the spectrum of this operator, it might not have eigenvalues x1 + k
and x2 + k, and so the state required by the game on the LHS of Eq. 5
might not exist. Furthermore, in the case in which this state does happen to
exist, the argument given in [D] would allow this equation to be incorrect.
Consider the example given in Eq. 4, and take x1 = 1, x2 = 0, and k = −1.
Then since, by Eq. 4, V[ 1√
2
(|0〉 + | − 1〉)] = −1 and V[ 1√
2
(|1〉 + |0〉)] = +1,
Eq. 5 reads −1 = 0.
On the other hand, it is possible to re-interpret the notation used in
Eq. 5 in a way that makes it correct. Let me set |x1, x2〉 =:
1√
2
(|x1〉+ |x2〉),
and define
V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → u1, x2 → u2]
to be the value of the following game: Xˆ is measured on the state |x1, x2〉;
if the outcome is x1, the utility is u1, while if the outcome is x2, the utility
is u2. The relation between this notation and the original notation is
V[ 1√
2
(|x1〉+ |x2〉)] = V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → x1, x2 → x2]. (6)
Now if we interpret the LHS of Eq. 5 not as V[|x1 + k, x2 + k〉; x1 + k →
x1+k, x2+k → x2+k], but rather as V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → x1+k, x2 → x2+k],
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we can re-write Eq. 5 as
V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → x1 + k, x2 → x2 + k] = k + V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → x1, x2 → x2].
(7)
This equation is meaningful (because the same state |x1, x2〉 is required in
the two games), and moreover it is correct. So perhaps this is the way we
were intended to understand Eq. 8 of [D].
We can now attempt to complete the derivation of Eq. 3, along the line
followed in [D]. Setting k = −x1 − x2 in Eq. 7, we get
V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → −x2, x2 → −x1] = −x1−x2+V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → x1, x2 → x2].
(8)
In this notation, the “zero-sum rule” (Eq. 9 of [D]) reads
V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → u1, x2 → u2]+V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → −u1, x2 → −u2] = 0, (9)
and if we use this (with u1 = −x2 and u2 = −x1) in Eq. 8, we get
−V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → x2, x2 → x1] = −x1−x2+V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → x1, x2 → x2].
(10)
This is our version of Eq. 10 of [D]. However, we cannot now go from this
equation to Eq. 3 (i.e., to Eq. 11 of [D]), since the values of the two games
which appear in Eq. 10 have not been shown to be equal (Of course, they
are equal under the condition that the two outcomes x1 and x2 are equally
probable, but that is precisely the condition that [D] does not want to as-
sume). In fact, in the example given by Eq. 4 with x1 = 1 and x2 = 0, the
outcome is surely x1, and so
V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → x1, x2 → x2] = x1 = 1
V[|x1, x2〉; x1 → x2, x2 → x1] = x2 = 0; (11)
Eq. 10 is satisfied (both sides equal 0), but Eq. 3 is not.
We are certainly not suggesting that Eq. 3 and the more general Eq. 1
(i.e., Eqs. 11 and 4 of [D]) are not correct; they do follow, after all, from the
usual quantum probability rules. Furthermore, we are not claiming to have
shown that these equations are not consequences of just the assumptions
(the non-probabilistic parts of quantum theory and of decision theory) that
were made in [D]. We do see, however, that the arguments given in [D] are
not sufficient to establish the validity of these equations.
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